Work in Progress

Yield Risks for Perennial Crops under Changing Climate Conditions

Agriculture is among the sectors most vulnerable to climate change, with perennial crops like apple orchards particularly at risk due to their long growth cycles and limited adaptive capacity. This study examines future yield risks using a unique orchard-level dataset and the Phenoflex model to predict phenological stages. We develop phenology-specific frost indicators and evaluate temperature effects while calibrating different chilling models. Our findings indicate a trend toward earlier flowering stages, higher average temperatures, fewer total spring frost days but more frost days dependent on specific phenological phases, and an increase in extreme heat events. Frost and extreme heat events show significant negative impacts on productivity, with frost effects during full bloom having the greatest effect. Overall, we find yield increases rather than losses over time, driven by warmer temperatures and reduced frost damage. However, uncertainties in climate projections and model assumptions limit the precision of these yield predictions, especially over long timescales. Under future climate scenarios, yield gains vary based on emissions pathways: the high-emission RCP8.5 scenario shows the largest yield increases, likely due to fewer frost days and a warmer growing season, while the lower-emission RCP2.6 scenario is associated with smaller yield gains.

To Adapt or Not to Adapt: How Swiss Fruit Farmers Respond to Climate Change

Climate change presents a significant threat to global agricultural livelihoods, with the perennial crop sector facing unique challenges due to its inherent path dependencies. Using survey data from the year 2022, this paper examines the effects of severe droughts and spring frost over the past decade, adaptation strategies, climate perceptions, and beliefs of perennial crop farmers in Switzerland. Key findings include significant harvest losses, particularly from frost; however, there is a greater concern about future drought impacts. Farmers’ estimates of temperature trends align more closely with projected trends than their assumptions about frost and precipitation, with those using fixed irrigation systems notably more accurate in recognizing precipitation trends than those without irrigation. Most farmers express concern about climate change and acknowledge the rise in global average temperatures. Climate skeptics demonstrate lower support for climate mitigation policies compared to believers but show a greater willingness to adapt. The study underscores the complexity of agricultural adaptation and the need for tailored solutions to enhance resilience against climatic changes.

Strategic Delegation in a Standard Public Goods Game (with Ralph Winkler and Alessandro Tavoni)

We provide the first experimental evidence of strategic delegation in the context of public good provision. In a two-stage game, we investigate whether and to what extent two principals delegate the public good choice to agents who hold a different valuation of the public good than their own (strategic delegation). According to theoretical predictions, delegating to an agent with a lower valuation of the public good than the principals themselves is only in their best interest when public good choices are strategic substitutes. To explore this, we conduct two different treatments, one with linear benefits from public good provision (rendering contribution choices dominant strategies) and one with strictly concave benefits (rendering contribution choices strategic substitutes). We find strong evidence for conditional cooperation, i.e., principals delegate to agents with higher benefits from public good provision if they expect the other principal to do the same. However, we observe no significant difference in delegation patterns between the two treatments. This may stem from principals’ limited expectations regarding changes in agent behavior relative to the agents’ valuation of the public good. Our findings suggest that the “race to the bottom” due to strategic delegation in public good provision may be less severe than predicted by economic theory.